A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences by Engelmann, D et al.
A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding
Preferences¤
Mariana Blanco Dirk Engelmann Hans-Theo Normann
Royal Holloway College, University of Londony
September 19, 2006
Abstract
We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences, inequality
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the same sample of subjects. From the data we estimate parameters of aversion to
disadvantageous and advantageous inequality. We then use these estimates to test
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1 Introduction
Currently, behavioral economists are putting a great deal of e®ort into developing models
of other-regarding preferences. This literature takes as its starting point that data from,
for example, the ultimatum game (GÄuth et al., 1982), the dictator game (Kahneman et
al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) and gift-exchange and trust games (Fehr et al., 1993; Berg
et al., 1995) are by and large not compatible with the self-interested utility maximizing
behavior of the traditional economic paradigm. The behavioral models attempt to explain
these experimental results by relaxing the assumptions of the standard model and allowing
for other-regarding motives.
Models of other-regarding preferences take into account the fact that participants' be-
havior is usually heterogenous (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). A robust ¯nding of various
experimental studies is that not all participants behave in the same way. Not all subjects
behave as the traditional model asserts they do, that is entirely sel¯shly, but neither do
all subjects behave entirely, say, altruistically. The heterogeneity of the subjects' behavior
suggests that models of other-regarding preferences should typically make predictions about
how the distribution of behavior varies over di®erent games.
This paper starts by noting that there are two ways in which predictions of this kind
can be tested. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature has relied almost
exclusively on aggregate-level tests. However, the validity of the model can also be tested
within subjects, that is, with individual-level analyses.1 Consider an example with two
games. In both games subjects may behave either \altruistically" or not, and some model
1Aggregate-level analysis means that studies look for consistency of the distribution of choices across
the experiments without considering whether individual subjects decide consistently with the theory across
experiments. Aggregate-level analysis does not mean here that an investigation focusses on aggregate
measures of the experimental data (such as means etc.).
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implies that the condition for altruistic behavior according to a model parameter is the
same in both games. An aggregate-level analysis can test the model by comparing the
share of subjects who behave altruistically in the two games. If the share of these subjects
is roughly the same in the two games, we would accept the model. The within-subjects
test would involve checking whether individual subjects make altruistic (or non-altruistic)
choices in both games. Noise in the data would of course mean that all subjects could not
be expected to behave consistently across games, but, for individual-level validity of the
model, the subjects who behave altruistically in the ¯rst game should have to be more likely
than the other subjects to make the altruistic choice in the second game. In other words,
accepting the model requires that behavior is correlated across games. The individual-level
test obviously requires related-sample data whereas the existing literature has only used
unrelated-sample data and, thus, has only made aggregate-level tests.
We believe that such individual-level data tests provide an interesting and useful ad-
ditional test of other-regarding preferences theories, in particular when it comes to their
behavioral validity. All other-regarding preferences theories that we are aware of are mi-
croeconomic models of decisions making, and explicitly state individual-level predictions.
The motivation for the development of other-regarding preferences theories is to obtain a
better description of behavior in experiments. Whether these accurately describe individual
behavior is therefore a central issue. It is generally considered that the other-regarding pref-
erences models predict aggregate outcomes well across several games. While this constitutes
remarkable progress in the interpretation of recent experimental ¯ndings, we believe this
success is incomplete without support from individual-level data. If a theory of individual
decision making works at the aggregate level but the data show that individual behavior
does not conform to the theory, we do not know what links the behavioral assumptions of
the theory with its aggregate-level support. Put another way, given the choice between two
comparable theories which work equally well at the aggregate level but only one of them
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is also supported at the individual level, preference would surely be given to the theory
that works at the individual level. One would simply feel more comfortable with a pre-
diction from a model that consistently re°ects individual behavior. We therefore believe a
within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences theories is both useful and warranted.
The lack of a comprehensive individual-level data study of other-regarding preference
theories is indeed somewhat surprising. Two prominent papers argue in favor of it. Fehr
and Schmidt (1999, p. 847) welcome this approach as \one of the most interesting tests
of our theory". Similarly, Andreoni et al. (2003, p. 683) argue that the comparison of
aggregate and individual-level data \gives a new and interesting dimension to the analysis
of experimental data". What is more, individual-level experimental data can easily be
produced. In fact, any related-sample design allows for the analysis of individual behavioral
patterns. To test a theory of individual behavior with aggregate-level data is a plausible
way of proceeding when individual-level data are not available or not reliable (for example,
¯eld data on voting). This, however, is not the case with the experiments that motivated
the other-regarding preferences literature.
The main novelty of this paper is that it provides a ¯rst systematic2 individual-level
data test of a behavioral theory. The behavioral theory we analyze is a model of inequality
aversion. This model was ¯rst proposed by Bolton (1991) and was re¯ned by Fehr and
2Andreoni and Miller (2002) conduct a within-subjects analysis across several dictator games with
di®erent costs of giving. The objective of their study is to test whether subjects are consistent with the
generalized axiom of revealed preferences and they ¯nd that most subjects are consistent. Andreoni et
al. (2003) also conduct an individual-level comparison in their paper. However, they analyze only one
game (a modi¯ed ultimatum game where sub jects play both the proposer and the responder roles), and the
individual-level comparison of decisions is arguably not the central part of the analysis (see also Section 5
below). Charness and Rabin (2002) use a related-sample design where subjects play two or four di®erent
games. They explicitly mention that they do not conduct an individual-level data analysis.
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Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Basically, inequality aversion stipulates
that individuals do not only care about their own material payo®, they also care about
the distribution of payo®s among players. In particular, individuals dislike having both a
lower and a higher payo® than others, and so, all else equal, an equal distribution of the
payo® maximizes their utility. Judging from citation ¯gures, the inequality aversion model
is very popular among experimental economists. Even though the model cannot explain
the ¯ndings of some experiments, the more recent extended behavioral models that aim at
explaining results in these experiments nevertheless include some concerns for equality.3
In the main part of the paper, we will test the model of inequality aversion by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999, henceforth F&S). Their model has the advantage of a straightforward
parametrization that can be easily estimated. Furthermore, F&S have been quite successful
in rationalizing aggregate behavior in many classic games. We run four di®erent experi-
ments (an ultimatum game, a modi¯ed dictator game, a sequential prisoner's dilemma and
a public-good game) with the same sample of experimental subjects. We then use the
responder data from the ultimatum game in order to estimate a parameter of aversion to
disadvantageous inequality, and we take data from the modi¯ed dictator game to estimate
a parameter of aversion to advantageous inequality. Because our paper is the ¯rst to study
an appropriate related-sample data set, it is also the ¯rst to report a joint distribution
of individual inequality aversion parameters. We then use this distribution to test several
explicit hypotheses about aggregate and individual behavior in the other games.
Our data show that results from the within-subject analysis we propose can di®er
markedly from results from aggregate-level tests. The inequality aversion model has con-
siderable predictive power at the aggregate level but often fails at the individual level as
3For example, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) explicitly builds on Fehr and Schmidt (1999), while Charness
and Rabin (2002) and Cox et al. (2006) assume that subjects are more altruistic towards others who have
relatively low payo®s.
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several of the correlations the model predicts will occur between the estimated parameters
and other decisions do not materialize. That is, the degree of inequality aversion that an
individual exhibits in the ultimatum game and in the modi¯ed dictator game has very little
explanatory power in other games at the individual level.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental
design, followed by an instrument check in Section 3. Section 4 presents the model and the
estimation of the model parameters. In Section 5 we test several hypotheses derived from
the inequality aversion model. In Section 6 we discuss our ¯ndings and Section 7 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We ran four di®erent two-person one-shot games of similar complexity with the same sample
of experimental subjects. We kept the initial total surplus at $20 across all games. Each
game was played exactly once by each subject. Two of the games involve two di®erent roles
for decision makers. In these games, each subject made a decision in both roles. Hence
subjects made decisions in six di®erent roles. When a role involved decisions in more than
one decision node, we used the so-called strategy elicitation method to elicit choices in all
these nodes.
Each of the four games was presented separately in a di®erent section of the experiment.
Instructions were distributed and were also read aloud in each of the four parts by the
experimenter and participants had the chance to ask questions. Once the experimenter
had ensured that everyone had understood the game, the corresponding computer screen
was displayed and subjects submitted their decisions. Only when all participants had made
their decisions in one game were the instructions for the following game distributed.
Subjects did not receive any feedback or payment until the end of the experimental
session. All decisions were to be made without any information on other subjects' choices
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and without any communication. At the end of the session, one game was chosen randomly
and subjects were randomly matched in pairs. In all games (except one where symmetric
players move simultaneously), the roles in the game were determined randomly between
the two subjects of each pair. The payments to the subjects were determined by the single
decision pair in the one game randomly chosen at the end. Subjects knew about this
procedure in advance and the computer screen at the end of the experiment informed them
about all the random draws of the computer and also about the payment-relevant decisions.
We believe that our design is appropriate for minimizing confounding e®ects among games
and avoiding subjects averaging their earnings across games.4
When selecting the games for our experiment, we wanted to make sure that we included
the most relevant ones in the other-regarding preferences literature. Therefore, we chose
the ultimatum game, the dictator game, and the public-good game. Finally, we used the
sequential prisoner's dilemma (Clark and Sefton, 2001) because it shares crucial qualitative
properties with the gift-exchange game (Fehr et al., 1993) and the trust or investment game
(Berg et al., 1995) but is much simpler. We also had to decide on the number of games to
be played. Four games seemed to us a reasonable compromise between generating a rich
data set and maintaining salient incentives (Smith, 2002). With a higher number of games,
we might have risked subjects not caring any longer about each individual decision.
We now introduce the four games as implemented in our experiment. See Table 1 for
a summary of our design. The ultimatum game (henceforth UG) (GÄuth et al., 1982) is a
sequential two-stage game. Given a pie of $20, the proposer has to make an o®er ($s)
to the responder, keeping $20¡ $s to himself. The responder can accept or reject the
o®er. In the case of a rejection both players earn zero. If the responder accepts, players
get the outcome proposed, $20¡ $s and $s; respectively. As mentioned above, we let
4Regarding feedback and payments, our design is very similar to Charness and Rabin (2002). See their
paper for a further discussion of issues arising due to the related-sample design.
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subjects decide as both proposers and responders. Since we wanted to avoid feedback,
the responder decisions can only be made based on a menu of hypothetical o®ers (this is
the aforementioned strategy-elicitation method). That is, when deciding as the responder,
subjects had to accept or reject a complete list of every possible distribution of the pie,
starting from $20-$0, $19-$1, $18-$2, ... all the way to $0-$20. As proposers' o®ers were
restricted to integers, there were 21 di®erent distributions to decide upon. If the ultimatum
game was selected as the game relevant for the ¯nal payment to subjects, the proposer's
actual o®er was compared to the responder's decision about this o®er and payments were
¯nalized according to the rules of the ultimatum game.
In the standard dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994), the dictator unilaterally deter-
mines how to divide a ¯xed amount of money ($20 in our case) between himself and the
recipient. The distribution chosen by the dictator is ¯nal. The standard dictator game
is not suitable for getting a point prediction of the parameter measuring aversion to ad-
vantageous inequality (see F&S). Therefore, we implemented a modi¯ed dictator game
(henceforth MDG) resembling more the dictator game in Kahneman et al. (1986) where
dictators could only choose between allocations of (10, 10) and (18, 2). In our modi¯cation,
the dictator has to decide about how much of the initial pie of $20 (if any) he is at most
willing to sacri¯ce in order to achieve an equal distribution of payo®s. More speci¯cally,
subjects were given a list of 21 pairs of payo® vectors, and they had to choose one of the
two payo® vectors in all 21 cases. The left payo® vector was always ($20, $0), that is, if
the left column was chosen, the dictator would receive $20 and the recipient nothing. The
right payo® vector contained equal payo®s varying from ($0, $0), ($1, $1) all the way
to ($20, $20).5 The MDG involves a decision maker and a passive player. Each subject
5In this modi¯ed dictator game, a purely self-centered individual would always choose ($20, $0) over
all equal payo® vectors up to ($19, $19), and would be indi®erent between ($20, $0) and ($20, $20). A
dictator who strongly dislikes advantageous inequality would always choose the right column with equal
7
made a choice in the role of the decision maker. If the MDG was randomly selected at the
end of the experiment, one of the 21 payo® vector pairs was randomly chosen and then the
dictator's decision determined the payments.
The sequential prisoner's dilemma (henceforth SPD) (Clark and Sefton, 2001) is a pris-
oner's dilemma where one player moves ¯rst, the other player second. The ¯rst mover can
cooperate or defect. After observing this action, the second mover responds either with
cooperation or defection. If both defect, both players receive a payo® of $10. If both
cooperate, they get $14 each. If one defects and the other cooperates, players earn $17
and $7, respectively. As in the ultimatum game, subjects had to play both roles. They
had to make two second-mover decisions, one if the ¯rst mover decides to defect and one if
he cooperates. When the SPD was selected as the game relevant for the ¯nal payment to
subjects, one subject was randomly allocated the role of ¯rst mover and the other the role
of second mover. Their payo®s were then determined based on their decisions.
Finally, the public-good game (henceforth PG) we used was a simple two-player volun-
tary contribution mechanism (see Ledyard, 1995, for a survey). The two players received
an endowment of $10 each. They simultaneously decide how much (if any) money from the
endowment to contribute to a public good. Each monetary unit that the individual keeps
for himself raises his payo® by exactly that amount. Both subjects receive $0:7 for each $1
contributed to the public good (this is the marginal return per capita). Note that, when
restricting actions to the extreme choices of zero and full contribution, the set of possible
payo®s is the same as in the SPD. If the public-good game was chosen for the ¯nal payo®s,
payo®s were calculated according to the contributions of the randomly paired players.
payo®s. Subjects with monotone preferences between these two extremes should switch at some point (if
at all) from choosing the left column to choosing the right column and should not switch back. The reason
is that the egalitarian outcome is \cheaper" for all decisions beyond the switching point. If a player prefers
($7, $7) to ($20; $0), this player should also prefer ($8; $8) to ($20; $0) and so on.
We implemented two di®erent sequences in which the games were played. Because of
the similarity of the games, we wanted to avoid either UG and MDG or PG and SPD being
played back-to-back. Also, because of the length of the instructions, we wanted the PG to
be the last game. This leaves two possible sequencing variants with either the ultimatum
game coming ¯rst and the dictator game coming third, or vice versa. The sequential
prisoner's dilemma would be played as the second game, and the public-good game would
be last. This is only a small subset of the 24 possible sequencing variants, but to run
su±ciently many repetitions of all variants does not appear to be feasible.6 We did not
¯nd any signi¯cant di®erences between the two sequences and therefore we pool the data
and refrain from further references to the sequences in the results section. Moreover, our
results do not di®er much from previous experiments where the four games were played in
isolation (see the next section) which also suggests the absence of sequencing e®ects.
We ran six sessions with 8 to 14 subjects in each session. All 72 subjects were non-
economists. In the data analysis below, we discarded 11 of those 72 subjects from the
data set. The reason is that these subjects do not have a unique switching point in the
MDG or no unique rejection threshold in the UG. Therefore, we cannot calculate their
inequality aversion parameters and decided to drop them from the analysis. Henceforth,
we will deal with a total of 61 subjects.7 The experimental software was developed in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 1999). Sessions lasted about 50 minutes and the average earnings were $11.
6Given that the ultimatum game and the SPD can be played in two and six sequences, respectively, we
would even have to take 288 di®erent variants into account.
7Holt and Laury (2002) elicit risk preferences with sets of binary choices similar to our UG responder
decisions and our MDG. In their data, 19.8% of the subjects had a non-unique switching point, slightly
more than the 15.3% we observed.
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3 Instrument check
In this section, we check whether the games we analyze below generate results similar to
those of previous experiments. Such an instrument check (Andreoni et al., 2003) is essential
for the signi¯cance of the main part of our analysis.
In our UG, proposers' mean o®er is 40% of the pie. Roughly half of the proposers (48%)
o®er the equal split which is also the modal and median o®er. About 11% of the o®ers
are consistent with subgame perfect equilibrium (which is to either o®er nothing or $1).
These results are remarkably similar to the results obtained under the standard UG design
as reported in the meta study of Oosterbeek et al. (2004). They also found a mean o®er
of 40%, and that 50% o®er the equal split. See also Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003).
Regarding responder decisions, our results are consistent with the categorization in F&S
(we elaborate on this extensively in the next section) which is derived from data in Roth
(1995).
In the MDG, the average switching point was roughly ($11, $11). The modal switching
point was ($10, $10) (with a frequency of 13%) and 43% of the subjects switched to the
egalitarian outcome in the range of ($0, $0) to ($9, $9). There are 8% of the subjects who
switch to the egalitarian outcome only when it is costless, at ($20, $20), and a further 10%
who do not switch at all, that is, they even choose ($20, $0) over ($20, $20). Two of 61
subjects choose ($0, $0) over ($20, $0). Because we use a novel modi¯cation of the dictator
game, the results cannot be directly compared with those reported for standard dictator
game experiments. One parallel that can be drawn is that Forsythe et al. (1994) found that
20% of the dictators chose not to pass anything to the other player, a ¯gure which is in line
with the number of subjects in our experiment who never choose the egalitarian outcome
or do so only when it is costless. Further, in Kahneman et al. (1986), 76% of dictators
prefer (10,10) over (18,2) which compares with the 62% of dictators in our experiment who
10
switch to the equal distribution at ($12,$12) or below. These dictators pay at least 8 out
of an initial pie of 20 to achieve an equal distribution like in Kahneman et al. and thus our
data are roughly in line with theirs, despite the di®erences in procedures.
In the SPD, 34% of the subjects cooperated as the ¯rst mover. In the role of second
mover, 38% cooperate following ¯rst mover's cooperation. Given ¯rst-mover defection,
nearly all subjects (94%) also defected. Our results are remarkably similar to those obtained
by Clark and Sefton (2001) in their SPD. The ¯gures they obtained (\baseline" treatment,
last round)8 are 32.5% cooperation of ¯rst movers, 38.5% second mover cooperation given
¯rst mover cooperation, and 96% defection given ¯rst mover defection.
In our PG, the average contribution was 47% of the endowment. Less than half the
endowment was contributed by 41% of the subjects, including 28% (of the total population)
who contributed nothing. Not contributing was also themodal behavior. More than half the
endowment was contributed by 44% of the subjects, including 18% (of the total population)
who contributed the entire endowment. Goeree et al. (2002) report on one-shot public-good
games. They have one treatment with two players where the marginal per capita return is
similar to ours (0:8).9 The average contribution in that treatment is 50%, very similar to
our average. Roughly 47% gave less than half the endowment and 53% gave more than half
the endowment. Considering that the equal split was not possible in Goeree et al. (2002),
since the endowment was 25 tokens, again, the results are remarkably similar to those we
8Clark and Sefton (2001) repeat their SPD and report cooperation rates in the ¯rst and the last rounds.
We consider the last round of their data more relevant for comparison to our one-shot setting. Moreover, the
percentage gain from exploiting compared to reciprocating cooperation is 21% in our game which compares
with the 20% gain in the \baseline" treatment of Clark and Sefton (2001).
9Most of the treatments in Goeree et al. (2002) distinguish between an internal and an external return
factor. We refer to the treatment (\N=2, $0.04, $0.04") where both factors are equal as in standard PG
experiments like ours.
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observed in the PG. Di®erences from our results are that they observe fewer cases of zero
contributions (10%) but also fewer full contributions (6%).
We conclude that our results successfully replicate those of other experiments (even in
the subgames of the UG and the SPD) despite our related-sample design. Therefore, our
design should be suitable for the individual-level test of the inequality aversion model.
4 Model and estimation of the parameters
In F&S' outcome-based theory, other-regarding preferences are modeled as inequality aver-
sion. This means that players are concerned not only about their own material payo® but
also about the di®erence between their own payo® and other players' payo®s. For two-player
games, a F&S utility function is given by
Ui(xi; xj) =
½
xi ¡ ®i(xj ¡ xi); if xi · xj
xi ¡ ¯i(xi ¡ xj); if xi > xj (1)
where xi and xj; i 6= j; denote the monetary payo®s to players i and j:
F&S make the following a priori assumptions on the distributions of the parameters.
First, they assume ¯i · ®i; meaning that individuals su®er more from disadvantageous
inequality than from advantageous inequality. Second, they impose 0 · ¯i < 1; where
0 · ¯i rules out individuals who enjoy being better o® than others and ¯i < 1 excludes
individuals who will burn money in order to reduce advantageous inequality. In order to
rationalize the results of other experiments, F&S further assume that ¯i < n=(n¡ 1) for
n = 6; hence ¯i < 0:83 (p. 832), and that ® and ¯ are positively correlated (p. 864).
Finally, F&S derive a distribution of ® and ¯ (see below) which they argue is consistent
with previous experimental evidence.10
10See also Shaked (2005) and Fehr and Schmidt (2005).
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We follow F&S in deriving the distribution of the parameter for aversion to disadvan-
tageous inequality, ®; from the UG responder decisions. Since we employ the strategy
elicitation method, the rejection thresholds in the ultimatum game give us (near) point
estimates of ®i for each individual. To see this, suppose s0i is the lowest o®er responder i is
willing to accept, and, consequently, s0i¡ 1 is the highest o®er i rejected (recall that choices
had to be integers). It follows that this responder (assuming well-behaved preferences) is
indi®erent between accepting some o®er si 2 [s0i ¡ 1; s0i] and getting a zero payo® from a
rejection. Therefore, we have Ui(si; 20¡ si) = si ¡ ®i(20¡ si ¡ si) = 0. (Note that only
the range of o®ers up to half of the pie is relevant here.)
Thus, the estimate of the parameter of disadvantageous inequality is
®i =
si
2(10¡ si) : (2)
For our estimation, we set si = s0i¡ 0:5: This is somewhat arbitrary but it in no way a®ects
our results because we use non-parametric tests which are based on ordinal rankings of
outcomes. A rational F&S player will always accept the equal split in the UG and hence
have s0i · 10; so division by zero cannot occur by assumption here. For a subject with s0i = 0;
we observe no rejected o®er and we cannot infer the indi®erence point si. Therefore, we
set ®i = 0 for participants with s0i = 0 but it could actually be that these subjects have
®i < 0; that is, they could positively value the payo® of another player who is better o®.11
For subjects who accept only si ¸ 10, we can only infer that ®i ¸ 4:5. We assign ®i = 4:5
to these subjects. This is somewhat arbitrary but not relevant in our analysis below.
Let us now turn to the parameter of aversion to advantageous inequality, ¯. F&S derive
the distribution of this parameter from o®ers in the UG. In our view, there are various
problems with this. First, proposers' o®ers depend on their beliefs about the other players'
11See Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004) for evidence that at least in non-
strategic games such preferences may occur.
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minimum acceptance threshold in the UG. F&S assume that proposers know the empirical
distribution of ®: While this is a plausible way of proceeding, their conclusions on the ¯
distribution hinge on the assumption that the beliefs are correct. Second, F&S derive the
¯ distribution assuming risk neutrality|which may not hold for all proposers. Risk averse
proposers may propose the equal split even if they do not care about inequality. Third,
even a relatively small number of responders with high rejection thresholds can imply that
the optimal decision of a sel¯sh proposer (¯ = 0) is to o®er half the endowment (this is
the case in our data, see below). In that case, no ¯ distribution can be derived because
all proposers should make the same o®er. Fourth and most importantly, with the method
F&S use, it is only possible to derive three relatively coarse intervals of the ¯ parameter
(see below).
We prefer to derive (nearly) exact point estimates for ¯i analogously to the way the ®i
were derived.12 In the UG, ®i is de¯ned by the o®er that makes responder i indi®erent
between accepting and rejecting the o®er. In our modi¯ed dictator game, we can get a
point estimate for ¯i by ¯nding the egalitarian allocation, (xi; xi); such that the dictator is
indi®erent between keeping the entire endowment, the (20; 0) outcome, and (xi; xi). In the
Appendix, we show that the design of our MDG is structurally the simplest design which
provides a point estimate for the whole range of relevant ¯: Note that both the ® and the
¯ parameters are derived from non-strategic choices. Neither the UG responder nor the
MDG choice depends on subjects' beliefs about how the other player is expected to play.
Suppose an individual switches to the egalitarian outcome at a payo® vector (x0i; x0i).
That is, he prefers (20; 0) over (x0i ¡ 1; x0i ¡ 1) but (x0i; x0i) over (20; 0). We conclude that he
is indi®erent between the (20; 0) distribution and the (exi;exi) egalitarian distribution where
12As will become clear below, all decisions have implications for the model parameters. However, we
refer to the parameters derived here as the ®i and ¯i because they are (near) point estimates. See also
Section 6.
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exi 2 [x0i ¡ 1; x0i] and x0i 2 f1; :::; 20g: From (1) we get Ui(20; 0) = Ui(exi; exi) if, and only if,
20¡ 20¯i = exi: This yields
¯i = 1 ¡ exi20 : (3)
For our data analysis, we use exi = x0i ¡ 0:5 (which, as above, does not a®ect the results
of non-parametric tests). However this does not work well at the boundaries. Subjects
who choose (0; 0) over (20; 0) are possibly willing to sacri¯ce more than $1 in order to
reduce the inequality by $1. Therefore, these subjects might have ¯i > 1: Since we do
not observe a switching point for these subjects, we cautiously assign ¯i = 1 to them in
the data. Similarly, subjects who prefer (20; 0) over (20; 20) are possibly willing to spend
money in order to increase inequality. These subjects might have ¯i < 0 but, again, we do
not observe a switching point for them and therefore we set ¯i = 0 for such subjects in our
data.13
In Table 2, we summarize the distributions of the ® and the ¯ parameters. The table
lists both the distribution as assumed in F&S and our results. For both parameters, F&S
assume few points in the density with mass (p. 844). The ® density is assumed to have mass
at ® = 0 (30%), ® = 0:5 (30%), ® = 1 (30%), and ® = 4 (10%). The ¯ density function in
F&S has mass at three points, ¯ = 0 (30%), ¯ = 0:25 (30%), and ¯ = 0:6 (40%). For the
comparison in Table 2, we prefer to interpret these mass points not literally but instead
refer to the broader intervals which F&S used in their derivation (see pp. 843-4). The
intervals in Table 2 for the ® parameter correspond to those intervals F&S suggest for the
rejection thresholds in the UG. Starting from the top segment, F&S propose the following
intervals. Subjects who reject even o®ers that are close to an equal split; subjects who insist
on getting at least one third of the pie; subjects who insist on getting at least a quarter
13F&S (p. 824) acknowledge that sub jects with ¯i < 0 may exist and indeed behavior consistent with
the existence of such preferences has been observed in the experiments of Huck et al. (2001).
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of the pie; and subjects who are willing to accept less than that. It is readily veri¯ed that
these rejection thresholds imply the intervals for the ® parameter in the table.14 Given these
intervals, the ® distribution we derive does not di®er signi¯cantly from the one assumed
in F&S (Â2 = 1:79; d:f: = 3; p = 0:618; one-sample test). At the extreme ends of the
distribution, we ¯nd nine subjects with ®i = 0 and eight subjects with ®i ¸ 4:5:
As for the ¯ distribution, we use the very intervals F&S (p. 844) derive. (F&S only assign
the aforementioned mass points within the intervals at a later stage.) The distribution of
¯ in our data di®ers signi¯cantly from the one in F&S (Â2 = 8:51; d:f: = 2; p = 0:014;
one-sample test). We ¯nd seven subjects (11%) with ¯ > 0:83; two of which have ¯i = 1.
We also observe six subjects with ¯i = 0.
A key novelty of our data set is that we can estimate the joint distribution of ® and ¯:
Previous research, including F&S, could not derive the joint distribution because related-
sample data were not collected. Figure 1 shows this joint distribution. Both parameters
turn out to be widely distributed in the population. It is apparent that the ®i and ¯i are not
signi¯cantly correlated and the Spearman correlation coe±cient con¯rms this (½ = ¡0:03;
p = 0:820). We ¯nd that 23 of our 61 subjects violate the F&S assumption that ®i ¸ ¯i:
They can be found to the left of the ® = ¯ line in the ¯gure.
To summarize, our method for deriving the ® and ¯ distribution has, to a large extent,
replicated the distribution chosen in F&S. Even though our ¯ distribution is signi¯cantly
di®erent from the one in F&S, the distributions do not di®er grotesquely, and indeed our
14The reader will note that the top interval in Table 2 corresponds to 4:5 · ® < 1 whereas F&S assign
® = 4 in the segment of subjects with the highest ®: The reason for this discrepancy is that F&S' description
of this interval (subjects who reject \o®ers even if they are very close to an equal split") applies best to
those responders in our data who accept only $10 or more. Since these subjects reject an o®er of $9, they
get ®i ¸ 9=(2(10 ¡ 9)) = 4:5. This value is only slightly higher than the ® = 4 F&S assign and, moreover,
F&S consider their own estimate \conservative".
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¯ distribution is rich enough to conduct meaningful tests of the model. In a way, this can
be seen as support of the distributions F&S assume at the aggregate level. However, the
joint distribution of ® and ¯ does not support two of the assumptions F&S make at an
individual level (®i ¸ ¯i; positive correlation of ®i and ¯i).15
5 Tests of the inequality aversion model
We now move on to test several hypotheses derived from the F&Smodel. Formal derivations
of the hypotheses are presented in the Appendix. We will analyze the results for a game
in two steps. We will ¯rst assess the predictive power at the aggregate level and second at
the individual level. The aggregate-level analysis will ignore the within-subject character of
our data and the analysis will be as if the data on the inequality aversion parameters and
those on the other decisions came from unrelated experiments. This is how previous tests
of the F&S model have proceeded. We will then go beyond that approach by analyzing the
individual-level data.
This is how we will conduct our tests formally. Like with the example in the introduction,
consider the ¯ctitious hypothesis \subject i will choose the altruistic action in some game
G if, and only, if ®i · ®", where ® is some numerical threshold derived from the model.
We will accept this hypothesis at the aggregate level if a chi-square test of proportions does
15Our UG design explicitly asks for acceptance or rejection of each possible o®er. Interestingly, we observe
seven subjects who consistently reject o®ers s ¸ s0 for some s0 > 10: Since s > 10 here, these decisions also
reveal that these subjects have a high degree of aversion towards advantages inequality (actually, ¯i > 1).
For these seven subjects, we ¯nd some relation to the ¯i we estimate from the MDG. The average ¯ i of these
subjects is higher than that of the rest of the sample (although this is not signi¯ cant at the ¯ve-percent
level). For two of these sub jects we ¯nd ¯ ¸ 1 based on the MDG. In any event, responders could expect
the probability of receiving such an o®er to be close to zero, so that their decisions are e®ectively cheap
talk.
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not indicate any signi¯cant di®erence between the share of subjects with ®i · ® and the
share of altruistic subjects in game G. At the individual level, the hypothesis is con¯rmed
if a chi-square test indicates that the proportion of subjects with ®i · ® who make the
altruistic choice is signi¯cantly larger than the proportion of subjects with ®i > ® who
do so.
The hypotheses we derive from F&S are sometimes not unconditional as in the example
but depend on the beliefs players hold about the inequality aversion (and resulting behavior)
of the other players. In those cases, we will ¯rst test what should happen when subjects
have correct beliefs about the distribution of inequality aversion parameters in the sample.
This is also the assumption underlying the analysis in F&S. Second, where appropriate, we
derive some auxiliary hypotheses at the individual level for arbitrary random beliefs which
are not correlated with players' types.
As for the statistical tools for our tests, we will almost exclusively apply non-parametric
tests. In addition to the chi-square test of proportions already mentioned, we will some-
times use correlation analysis (Spearman correlation for two ordinally scaled variables; rank
biserial correlation for one ordinally scaled variable and one dichotomous nominally scaled
variable; phi coe±cient for two dichotomous nominally scaled variables). Non-parametric
tests interpret the data in an ordinal fashion which we consider appropriate here. Be-
cause non-parametric tests use only ordinal rankings, they may apply equally to possible
non-linear generalizations of F&S, an issue we discuss below.
5.1 O®ers in the ultimatum game
Our main hypothesis for the ultimatum game is as follows.
Hypothesis 1 (i) Subjects with ¯i > 0:5 should o®er si = 10 in the Ultimatum Game. (ii)
Subjects with ¯i < 0:5 may, depending on their beliefs, o®er either si = 10 or si < 10 in
the Ultimatum Game.
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Consider part (i). We take a look at the aggregate level ¯rst and compare predictions
and data as if they came from di®erent data sets and without taking the available within-
subject information into account. In the data, we have 33 subjects with ¯i > 0:5 and 26
subjects with ¯i < 0:5:16 In the UG, we observe 29 subjects who o®er s = 10. The aggregate
outcome of s = 10 o®ers is not inconsistent with F&S since subjects with ¯i < 0:5 should
o®er z < 10 for some beliefs. The deviation of actual from the predicted s = 10 observations
is (33¡29)=33 = 12:1% which seems small enough to consider the F&S prediction reasonably
accurate. More formally, we cannot reject that the share of subjects with ¯i > 0:5 is the
same as the share of subjects o®ering s = 10 (Â2 = 0:544; d:f: = 1; p = 0:461). At the
aggregate level, we can accept Hypothesis 1 (i).
At the individual level, the data do not support the F&S model. Among the 33 subjects
with ¯i > 0:5; 18 chose s = 10, only slightly more than half of this group. A chi-square
test on the ¯i > 0:5 observations cannot reject that choices are equiprobable (Â2 = 0:273;
d:f: = 1; p = 0:602; one-sample test17). Robustness checks with various thresholds ¯ 2
[0:3; 0:7] reveal that the insigni¯cance of the result does not depend on the particular value
of the ¯ = 0:5 threshold. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 1 (i) at the individual level.
As for the second part of the hypothesis, among the 26 subjects with ¯i < 0:5; 11
chose s = 10: The individual behavior of these subjects is consistent with Hypothesis 1 (ii)
if subjects hold heterogenous beliefs18 but it seems remarkable that the share of subjects
16There are two subjects in the sample who o®er s > 10: These subjects are not consistent with F&S
regardless of their ¯ parameter. Therefore, we cannot interpret their UG o®er within the inequality aversion
model and so we discard them from the analysis. Note also that ¯i = 0:5 for no subject in our sample, so,
we only need to distinguish ¯i ? 0:5.
17We cannot apply a two-sample test here (that is, testing the ¯i > 0:5 part of the sample versus the
¯i < 0:5 part) because we do not have an unconditional hypothesis for the ¯i < 0:5 subjects.
18Note that, if we claim that the behavior of the ¯ < 0:5 subsample is consistent, the aggregate outcome
no longer supports F&S. The reason is that, if the s = 10 choices of ¯ < 0:5 sub jects are to be rational F&S
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o®ering s = 10 here does not di®er signi¯cantly from the one observed for the ¯i > 0:5
subjects (Â2 = 0:871; d:f: = 1; p = 0:351). Figure 2 graphically displays the ¯ndings on
Hypothesis 1 at the aggregate and individual level.
Assume now that subjects know the true distribution of ®. In that case, it turns out
that all subjects should o®er s = 10 in the Ultimatum Game, regardless of their ¯i. This
hypothesis is clearly rejected from what was said above. On the one hand, this might result
from subjects' beliefs being wrong. On the other hand, it could be that the behavior of
proposers is not accurately captured by the ¯ parameter. Furthermore, this observation
con¯rms our decision not to derive the ¯ parameter from the ultimatum game. From our
UG proposer data, no ¯ distribution can be derived.19
choices, we should observe 44 s = 10 choices in total, which is substantially di®erent from the 29 actual
observations, with a deviation from the prediction of (44 ¡ 29)=44 = 34:1%. In other words, the degree
of freedom arising due to arbitrary beliefs about responder behavior can only be used to either rationalize
the outcome at the aggregate level or the behavior of the ¯ < 0:5 subsample.
19The result may also indicate that the assumption of risk-neutral behavior underlying F&S' analysis is
not appropriate here. Expected payo®s from o®ering s > 5 are relatively °at. Assuming ¯i = 0 and given
the responder behavior in our data, o®ering s 2 f6; 7g yields 9:0 on average, o®ering s 2 f8; 9g yields an
expected payo® of roughly 9:6, and o®ering the equal split always yields a payo® of 10. Given these very
similar expected payo®s, small di®erences in risk attitudes might provide a more plausible explanation for
the heterogeneity of UG o®ers than inequality aversion does. The °at expected payo®s also highlight the
point made above that UG o®ers are not suitable for deriving the distribution of ¯ parameters. Suppose,
in contrast to what we ¯nd, that the highest expected utility occurred (for a ¯ i = 0 player) for some o®er
s < 10 just as F&S assume. Even though F&S's derivation of the ¯ parameter could, in principle, be
applied, Harrison's (1989) \°at maximum" critique would apply. This critique suggests that deviations
from the actual maximum should be interpreted with caution when payo®s do not di®er much around the
maximum.
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Whereas the previous argument highlights the role of beliefs for proposer behavior, it is
possible to make a prediction for general uncertain proposer beliefs. It is easy to show that
UG o®ers of subjects with ¯i < 0:5 should be positively correlated with ¯i; at least as long
as beliefs (concerning the rejection probability) are not systematically negatively correlated
with ¯. The Spearman correlation coe±cient is not signi¯cant (½ = 0:187; p = 0:350)20,
however. (We restricted the test to the subjects with ¯i < 0:5 because the other subjects
should o®er s = 10 anyway, so no correlation should occur. If we nevertheless include the
subjects with a ¯i larger than 0.5 in the correlation analysis, the result does not change.
See Table 3 below.) We conclude that the ¯ data have explanatory power regarding the
UG o®ers at the aggregate level but not at the individual level.
5.2 Contributions to the public good
Hypothesis 2 (i) Subjects with ¯i < 0:3 should not contribute in the PG. (ii) Subjects
with ¯i > 0:3 may, depending on their beliefs, contribute any amount between zero and
their entire endowment.
We start with part (i) analyzing the data at the aggregate level. There are 20 subjects
with ¯i < 0:3 and we observe 17 subjects who contribute zero. The data at the aggregate
level are consistent with F&S if we assume that all 41 subjects with ¯ > 0:3 believe the
other player will contribute as well (there are no subjects with ¯ = 0:3). The formal test
suggests that the proportion of zero contributors is not signi¯cantly di®erent from the one
of ¯i < 0:3 subjects (Â2 = 0:349; d:f: = 1; p = 0:55). Following Andreoni (1995), one could
argue that merely positive but small contributions in the PG result from confusion and do
not indicate a true intention to cooperate. Therefore, we alternatively consider subjects
who contribute less than half of the endowment as non-contributors. There are 25 subjects
20We report two-tailed p values throughout.
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who do contribute less than half of their endowment. Again, this is consistent with F&S
at the aggregate level (Â2 = 0:88; d:f: = 1; p = 0:348).
At the individual level, among the 20 subjects with ¯i < 0:3; 13 [10] choose a positive
contribution [at least half their endowment]. This is not consistent with F&S. A chi-square
test on the ¯i < 0:3 observations cannot reject that the proportions of zero versus positive
contributors are equiprobable (Â2 = 1:80; d:f: = 1; p = 0:18; one-sample test), where
the deviation from equiprobable choices is opposite to the prediction. The proportion of
contributors of less than half the endowment is exactly 10 out of 20 and therefore not
signi¯cantly di®erent from being equiprobable (Â2 = 0:00; d:f: = 1; p = 1:00; one-sample
test). Among the subjects with ¯ ¸ 0:3, 31 of 41 made a positive contribution, and 26
contributed at least half the endowment. This outcome is consistent with F&S. However,
the di®erence from the subjects with ¯i < 0:3 is not signi¯cant when considering both
merely positive contributions (Â2 = 0:75; d:f: = 1; p = 0:39) and contributions of at least
half of the endowment (Â2 = 1:00; d:f: = 1; p = 0:32). As robustness checks, we analyzed
various levels of contributions to the PG and various thresholds of ¯: None suggested a
signi¯cant explanatory power of the ¯ parameter at the individual level (for example, the
share of subjects who contribute the entire endowment of 10 to the PG is almost identical for
the ¯i ? 0:3 subpopulations, 3 out of 20 (¯i < 0:3) and 8 out of 41 (¯i > 0:3), respectively).
Figure 3 summarizes these results.
Next, we can check whether PG contributions are more basically correlated with the ®
and ¯ parameters. Straightforward reasoning (see also F&S) suggests that contributions
to the PG of subjects with ¯i > 0:3 should be negatively correlated with ®i and positively
correlated with ¯i: The intuition behind the hypothesis is that, the higher ®i; the more
subject i su®ers from being exploited in the PG. Hence, if a subject is uncertain about
the contribution of the other subject, a higher ®i makes the subject contribute less or even
nothing. The opposite holds for the advantageous inequality parameter, ¯i: However, we
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cannot ¯nd support for the model at the individual level here either. Spearman correlation
coe±cients indicate that the correlations have the right sign but neither the correlation
between ®i and contributions (½ = ¡0:177; p = 0:268) nor that between ¯i and contributions
(½ = 0:104; p = 0:520) are signi¯cant for the ¯i > 0:3 subjects.21 The results do not change
in favor of the F&S model when we also include the subjects with ¯i < 0:3; or when we
include only subjects with some higher ¯i > e¯ 2 [0:3; 0:6].22
Finally, we consider the case where subjects know the true joint ®-¯ distribution. If
this is the case, no subject should contribute to the PG.23 From the fact that 44 subjects
contribute a positive amount, we conclude that F&S does not provide an accurate joint
representation of both subjects' behavior and beliefs, but we cannot distinguish whether it
21If we take a look at the more extreme choices in the PG data, we even ¯nd that subjects who have an
®i > 2 are more likely to contribute the full endowment compared to the rest of the sample (Â2 = 5:645;
d:f: = 1; p = 0:018) whereas the F&S model predicts the opposite.
22Since ® and ¯ in°uence the optimal level of contributions simultaneously, we also ran a simple least
squares regression with the level of contribution as dependent variable and both ® and ¯ as independent
variables. Again the impact of both inequality parameters is far from signi¯cant (p = 0:843 and p = 0:565
for ® and ¯; respectively). The same holds for probits for the decision to contribute either more than zero,
at least half or all of the endowment.
23The proof is by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. First, note as above that for the 20
subjects with ¯ < 0:3 contributing nothing is strictly dominant. Knowing that, the remaining 41 subjects
face a player who contributes zero with probability ¸ 1=3. Hence, making a positive contribution is
dominated for subjects with 2¯=3 ¡ ®=3 < 0:3 since it reduces advantageous inequality with probability
· 2=3 but increases disadvantageous inequality with probability ¸ 1=3. This is true for 28 of the remaining
subjects. Eliminating dominated strategies, the remaining subjects face with probability ¸ 4=5 a player
who contributes 0 and hence making a positive contribution is dominated if ¯=5 ¡4®=5 < 0:3 which is true
for all remaining players. Hence, all players contributing nothing is the only (Bayesian) equilibrium.
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does not capture behavior or beliefs (or both).24
5.3 Second move in the SPD
By backward induction, we start analyzing the SPD with second-mover behavior. Note that
the next hypothesis does not depend on beliefs. Therefore, behavior should unconditionally
depend on the inequality aversion parameters only, making the analysis simpler than the
above cases.
Hypothesis 3 (i) Given ¯rst-mover cooperation, second movers in the SPD should defect
if, and only if, ¯ < 0:3: (ii) Given ¯rst-mover defection, second movers in the SPD should
defect.
Consider the aggregate level ¯rst. Regarding part (i) of the hypothesis, we have 20
subjects with ¯i < 0:3 in the data but we have 38 subjects who defect given ¯rst mover co-
operation. Prediction and experimental data di®er by (38¡20)=20 = 90%. The hypothesis
that the proportion of ¯i < 0:3 players is identical to the proportion of defectors is rejected
(Â2 = 10:65; d:f:= 1; p = 0:001). As for part (ii), subjects should defect given ¯rst-mover
defection and indeed 57 out of 61 subjects did so. While this strongly supports F&S, we
24It is also possible to test a di®erent hypothesis, namely that subjects know the true distribution of PG
contributions and play their F&S best response. We numerically derived each subject's optimal contribution
given their ® and ¯: On the aggregate level, results do not con¯rm F&S predictions. They predict 20 positive
contributions whereas we observe 44. This di®erence is highly signi¯cant (Â2 = 18:93; d:f: = 1; p < 0:001).
The model does have some limited predictive power even though the Spearman correlation of predicted
and observed contributions is not signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent level (½ = 0:22; p = 0:093). The result is
driven by the fact that the F&S prediction only rarely predicts a positive contribution but, if it does, it is
quite often right. Subjects predicted to have a positive contribution typically have a high ¯i : Indeed, all
but two subjects predicted to make a positive contribution violate the ®i ¸ ¯i assumption of F&S.
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note that F&S makes the same prediction here as the standard theory of rational payo®
maximization.
Interestingly, even though F&S fails to explain choices at the aggregate level in part
(i), the individual ¯i have predictive power regarding second mover decisions when ¯rst
movers cooperate. When ¯ < 0:3; 16 out of 20 subjects defect whereas, when ¯ > 0:3;
\only" 22 out of 41 defect. This di®erence in cooperation rates is signi¯cant (Â2 = 3:97;
d:f: = 1; p = 0:046). As above, we look for basic correlations between decisions here, and
the rank biserial correlation between the cooperation decision and ¯ supports part (i) of
the hypothesis (rrb = 0:341; p = 0:007). Part (ii) of the hypothesis is strongly supported
also at the individual level as virtually all subjects decided according to the F&S theory.
We conclude that F&S has predictive power at the individual level but not at the aggregate
level for second movers in the SPD, and we summarize this ¯nding in Figure 4.
5.4 First move in the SPD
We ¯nally turn to the ¯rst movers. First-mover behavior depends on the beliefs of the
subjects about whether or not second movers will reciprocate cooperation. If subject i
believes with probability one that the second mover will reciprocate cooperation, i should
cooperate regardless of the inequality aversion parameters. Similarly, if i believes that
the second mover will exploit cooperation, i should defect as well. Hence, if subjects
hold degenerate beliefs, the ® and ¯ parameters do not imply a hypothesis on ¯rst mover
behavior. We therefore start by assuming correct beliefs here.
Hypothesis 4 If subjects know the true distribution of the ¯ parameter, ¯rst-movers in
the SPD should cooperate if, and only if, ®i < 0:52.
In the data, we have 30 subjects with ®i < 0:52 and we have 21 subjects who cooperate
as ¯rst movers. The share of ®i < 0:52 subjects and ¯rst mover cooperators does not di®er
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signi¯cantly at the ¯ve-percent level (Â2 = 2:729; d:f: = 1; p = 0:099). While the F&S
prediction is not perfectly accurate here, it is not completely o® the mark either. However,
at the individual level the data is not consistent with F&S. Among the 30 subjects with
®i < 0:52; 10 cooperate as ¯rst movers. The share of cooperators is virtually identical for
the subjects with ®i > 0:52 (11 of out of 31) so the Â2 test does not suggest predictive power
of the model at the individual level (Â2 = 0:031; d:f: = 1; p = 0:86). See also Figure 5.25
A simple test for correlations does not suggest any predictive power of the model on the
individual level either. If we assume alternatively that ¯rst movers' beliefs are random, then
¯rst-mover cooperation decisions and ®i should be negatively correlated. The intuition is
the same as in the PG. First movers with a higher ® are more averse towards being exploited
and hence require a higher probability of second mover cooperation in order to cooperate.
The rank biserial correlation coe±cient of individual i's ¯rst-mover \cooperate" decision
and ®i is, however, practically zero (rrb = ¡0:032; p = 0:806). It appears that aversion
against disadvantageous inequality does not have explanatory power regarding ¯rst-mover
behavior at the individual level even though it predicts the aggregate level reasonably well.
5.5 Correlations across games
We conclude this section by reporting correlations across all decisions of the experiment.
This is done, ¯rst, for the sake of completeness and, second, because we want to exclude
the possibility that individual behavior shows no systematic patterns at all across games.
A reason for this could be that participants are confused by the multi-game setting and just
25Alternatively, we could assume that sub jects know the true distribution of second mover choices instead
of the true distribution of the ¯ parameter. In that case, no ¯rst mover should cooperate (see the proof
of Hypothesis 4 and note that we have 23 subjects who cooperate as second mover; this implies that ¯rst
movers cooperate only if ®i < ¡0:06 which cannot hold for any subject). This hypothesis is rejected since
21 subjects cooperate as ¯rst movers.
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play random choices. Or they might feel an irrational need to vary their choices, behaving
fairly or cooperatively in one game and then behaving sel¯shly in the next. In any event,
if individual behavior turned out to be completely random across decisions, the inequality
aversion model could hardly be blamed for failing to predict individual decisions well.
Our data does exhibit clear patterns. Table 3 presents the correlation coe±cients across
the decisions made in the experiment. (We exclude the second move in the SPD given
¯rst-mover defection in Table 3 because virtually all subjects defect in this case and, hence,
this decision cannot reveal any insightful correlations). Each cell contains the appropriate
correlation coe±cient and signi¯cant correlations are indicated with asterisks. We observe
¯ve signi¯cant correlations (plus one more if we consider PG distributions as a dichotomous
variable, see below) which allows us to conclude that behavior is not random or irrationally
varied across decisions.
Are the observed correlations intuitive and are they consistent with F&S? One of the ¯ve
correlations (second move in the SPD and ¯) we have noted and discussed above already.
Three of the four remaining correlations concern the second move in the SPD (given ¯rst-
mover cooperation). This decision is positively correlated with UG o®ers, the ¯rst move in
the SPD and contributions to the public good. Players should cooperate as second movers
(given the ¯rst mover cooperates) if, and only if, ¯i > 0:3; that is, the second move in
the SPD is a good indicator of aversion to advantageous inequality. This implies that the
correlations of second mover decisions with UG o®ers and PG contributions are consistent
with F&S as both are associated with a high ¯. The correlation of ¯rst and second mover
decisions in the SPD is di±cult to reconcile with the inequality aversion model.26 This
26A F&S player will cooperate at both stages in the SPD if, and only if, e® > ®i ¸ ¯i > 0:3 (for the
derivation of e®, see the proof of Hypothesis 4). A F&S player will defect at both stages in the SPD if, and
only if, ®i ¸ e® and ¯i · 0:3: Hence, if we elicited the ®i and ¯ i from these decisions, this would imply a
negative correlation of the inequality aversion parameters which is inconsistent with the F&S model. Recall
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correlation is, however, consistent with a consensus e®ect27 which implies that cooperating
second movers expect higher cooperation rates.28
Another correlation we ¯nd is between UG o®ers and ®i. This result is to be expected
if we assume that subjects' beliefs show a consensus e®ect which implies that, all other
things equal, a proposer with a higher ® will expect generally higher rejection rates which
will (weakly) increase his utility-maximizing o®er. This hypothesis is clearly supported
by the strong correlation in Table 3. Andreoni et al. (2003) made the same comparison
and found a similar correlation (see their \standard" treatment). The correlation between
UG o®ers and ®i is consistent with F&S but it does not con¯rm any prediction of the
model either. We conclude that, in addition to di®erences in risk attitudes, di®erences in
expectations about the behavior of the responders can explain the variation in UG o®ers.
Finally, the correlation between UG o®ers and ®i suggests that, if it was feasible to derive
the ¯ parameter from UG o®ers (which is not the case in our data), then the ® and ¯
parameters would be positively correlated as F&S assume.
The correlation between PG contributions and the SPD ¯rst-mover decision misses
the ¯ve-percent signi¯cance level (rrb = 0:244; p = 0:058) but a chi-square test with a
dichotomous decision in the PG (contribute zero or a positive amount) and SPD ¯rst-mover
decision is signi¯cant (Â2 = 5:36; d:f: = 1; p = 0:011). In the F&S model, both the ¯rst
that 45 out of 61 subjects made the same decisions as ¯rst and second movers.
27In the social psychology literature the so-called \false consensus e®ect" is well-established (see Mullen et
al., 1985). Since the label \false" is misleading because such beliefs are in principle consistent with Bayesian
updating (see Dawes, 1989) \consensus e®ect" is a more appropriate term. See Engelmann and Strobel
(2000) for evidence that sub jects in an experiment with monetary incentives exhibit a clear consensus e®ect
but no truly false consensus e®ect.
28If we assume that beliefs are subject to a consensus e®ect, then ¯rst mover cooperation should be
positively correlated with ¯; because a higher ¯ implies a higher expectation of second mover cooperation.
As seen in Table 3, this correlation is virtually zero.
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move in the SPD and PG contributions are associated with a low ® parameter. Therefore
this correlation con¯rms F&S|although we note that neither decision is correlated with
the ® parameter.
As for consistency of choices across games, it is also instructive to look at single indi-
viduals. About one third of our subjects (20 out of 61) behave consistently in the UG, SPD
and PG in the following sense. There are nine subjects who o®er the equal split in the
UG, cooperate both as ¯rst and as second mover in the SPD, and contribute at least half
of their endowment in the PG. We also observe eleven participants o®ering less than the
equal split in the UG, defecting at both moves in the SPD and contributing less than half
of their endowment on the PG.29 We think it conceivable that these subjects perceive some
behavioral norm and that they conform to the norm or violate it but, whatever explains
the choices of these subjects, some of their behaviors are in line with inequality aversion,
others are in contrast to it. O®ering the equal split [less than the equal split] in the UG
and cooperating [defecting] as the second mover is associated with a high [low] ¯: This is
con¯rmed in the data (even though there are no signi¯cant di®erences according to median
tests). Cooperating [defecting] as the ¯rst mover and [not] contributing to the PG is as-
sociated with a low [high] ®: This is not supported by the data as the group of subjects
defecting in the cooperation games and o®ering less than the equal split in the UG have a
lower ®i (median test, Â2 = 4:234; d:f:= 1; p = 0:040) compared to the rest of the sample,
and the subjects in other group have (insigni¯cantly) higher ®i. The point here is not to
reiterate the lack of explanatory power of the ® parameter in these games but to note, ¯rst
of all, that a sizable share of our sample appears to exhibit stable preferences and, second,
29Consistent here does not mean consistent with F&S, but with a plausible behavioral norm. A rational
F&S player may well o®er the equal split in the UG and cooperate as the second mover but defect as the
¯rst mover and in the PG (and vice versa). However, there are only two and one subject(s), respectively,
who behave like that.
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that even the behavior of subjects who make consistent choices across games is not always
captured by inequality aversion. The behavioral norm underlying this behavior could be
to be generally cooperative but to also demand this from others, that is, to have a high
rejection threshold in the UG. This behavior partly indicates a strong degree of inequality
aversion, partly just the opposite.
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss possible explanations for our ¯ndings. We found that F&S is
by and large consistent with the data from UG proposals, PG contributions and the ¯rst
move in the SPD at the aggregate level but not at the individual level. For second-mover
behavior (given ¯rst-mover cooperation) in the SPD, the model had predictive power at
the individual level but not at the aggregate level. How can we account for these results?
Our general view of these results is that the success of the inequality aversion model
at an aggregate level may be based on its ability to qualitatively capture di®erent relevant
motives in di®erent games but that the low predictive power of the model at an individual
level is driven by the low correlation of these motives within subjects. Apparently, while
subjects might follow some idea of fairness across various games, this is not systematically
captured by the inequality aversion parameters at the individual level.
At this point, it is important to note that F&S do not only regard distributional con-
cerns per se as important driving behavioral forces, but also intentions or reciprocity. The ®
and ¯ parameters \can be interpreted as a direct concern for equality as well as a reduced-
form concern for intentions" (F&S, p. 853). The reason why inequality aversion may well
capture reciprocity is that, in most experiments, both motives coincide (consider the ulti-
matum game where rejecting a low o®er reduces the inequality of payo®s and corresponds
to negative reciprocity). Closely related to the emphasis on reciprocity, Fehr and Schmidt
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(2006) suggest that other-regarding preferences should be derived from a \strategic situa-
tion". They de¯ne a strategic situation as one where the recipient of a gift can a®ect the
material payo® of the sender of the gift. Obviously, reciprocity can only play a role in a
strategic situation.
Indeed, the distinction between strategic and non-strategic situations helps considerably
in understanding our results. Our ® parameter is derived from a strategic situation whereas
the ¯ parameter is not. We found that the ¯ derived from the MDG is correlated neither
with PG contributions nor UG o®ers but that the second move in the SPD (given ¯rst-
mover cooperation) is positively correlated with these decisions. Whereas the ¯i domeasure
literal inequality aversion, they cannot capture reciprocity. By contrast, the second move
in the SPD is certainly a strategic situation and also one where reciprocity matters. Hence,
it appears that PG contributions and UG o®ers are not so much driven by literal inequality
aversion30 but by reciprocity and expectations of reciprocity, and|if we see their model as
a shortcut for reciprocity|this is fully consistent with F&S.
However, the interpretation of the F&S model as a reduced form for reciprocity does
not explain all our ¯ndings. The ® parameter does not have predictive power in the PG
and in the ¯rst move of the SPD even though the ®i are derived from a strategic situation
where reciprocity plays a role. Also, both the ¯rst and the second moves in the SPD are
presumably driven by reciprocity and expectations of reciprocity, and the two decisions
are positively correlated but, as noted above, the inequality aversion parameters cannot
really explain this well. Further, if we regard F&S mainly as a model of reciprocity, this
raises the question of when \pure" distributional motives will still play a role. For example,
behavior in the second move in the SPD is predicted well by the ¯ parameter. While
this is consistent with F&S, the systematic distinction between strategic and non-strategic
30It has been suggested before that UG o®ers are not driven by inequality aversion or altruism but that
players behave strategically (Forsythe et al., 1994; Camerer, 2003, p. 56).
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situations is blurred here. It appears that both reciprocity and distributional moves are
important in the SPD. Put di®erently, to fully account for our data, one would need to
allow for subjects having both a \distribution" (or non-strategic) ¯ and a \reciprocity" (or
strategic) ¯; where only the former matters in MDG, only the latter in UG and PG, but
both for SPD second move.
Camerer (2003, p. 56) proposes a distinction that is similar to the one between strategic
and non-strategic situations suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (2006). He writes
\I suspect that Proposers behave strategically in ultimatum games because
they expect Responders to stick up for themselves, whereas they behave more
fairly- mindedly in dictator games because Recipients cannot stick up for them-
selves. This behavior could be codi¯ed in a theory of reciprocal fairness that
includes responsibility."
Camerer goes on to de¯ne the last-moving player who a®ects some player i's payo® as the
one \responsible" for i. If that responsible player is not player i then this player must take
some care to treat i fairly. Otherwise, the player can treat i neutrally and expect i to be
responsible for himself. According to this de¯nition, both our ®i and ¯i are derived from
decisions where the decision maker is responsible. Like F&S' concept of a strategic situation,
this notion of responsibility can explain the fact that PG contributions and UG o®ers are
not correlated with ¯i: Additionally, it can explain why neither the PG contributions nor
the ¯rst move of the SPD are correlated with the ®i as subjects are responsible when
deciding about the UG o®ers but not in PG and SPD (¯rst move). Finally, players are
responsible both in the second move in the SPD and in the MDG, and this is consistent
with the positive correlation between the two choices. Here, the question arises why the
second move in the SPD is also correlated with PG and UG o®ers where the player is not
responsible.
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Characterizations of decisions according to whether they are strategic or according to
whether subjects are responsible illustrate that di®erent situations might trigger di®erent
behavior. At an aggregate level, a theory based on just one motive might still be relevant|
in particular if, as it seems to be the case with inequality aversion, it can account for various
behavioral forces in an \as if" manner. At the individual level, in spite of the multiplicity
of motives, we can still con¯rm a model if the same motives are relevant (for example, the
second move of the SPD is consistent with PG, UG o®ers and ¯) but contradictions can
easily arise (for example, the ® parameter does not predict the PG and the ¯rst move of
the SPD). We would hence expect a model calibrated on decisions in one type of game to
yield reliable predictions only within the class of games where the same motives dominate.
Since this is di±cult to know ex-ante, deriving predictions for new games appears to be
problematic.31
Concluding, our ¯ndings suggest that, in addition to the heterogeneity of subjects along
one dimension (say, inequality aversion), the multiplicity of behavioral motives gives rise
to a multi-dimensional heterogeneity that is di±cult to account for in a simple model.
For example, surely not all subjects ignore distributional motives when making a strategic
choice. However, it is also clear that for some subjects inequality aversion is dominated by
other concerns when making a strategic choice. As a result, for UG proposals, di®erences
in expectations or risk aversion appear to dominate di®erences in concerns for equality.
Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that preferences are stable and that subjects
are rational. Our test is, hence, one of a joint hypothesis that the model correctly describes
subjects' preferences, that these preferences are stable and that subjects are rational. Of
course, it could be the case that subjects' preferences are not stable or that participants are
31For example, as discussed above, a ¯ parameter estimated based on SPD second mover behavior would
have predictive power for behavior in MDG, UG and PG. Why it works better than, say, estimates derived
from UG o®ers is, at least ex ante, not clear.
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not fully rational. Regarding the instability of preferences, indeed, the social psychology
literature generally reports low predictability of how an individual will behave in a given
situation from past behavior and concludes that the speci¯cs of the situation are important
for individual decisions (Ross and Nisbett, 1991). A potential lack of stability of subjects'
preferences might play a role in our results. Our data does, however, exhibit quite some
consistency and, in some cases, substantial correlations between decisions. This may be
due to the fact that subjects made the choices within a relatively short time period and
under identical conditions. It appears to us that the major factor underlying the partial
failure of the model at the individual level is the multiplicity of relevant behavioral forces
rather than their instability.
This distinction may be partly a matter of taste. While one could, for example, argue
that altruism is not stable if a subject behaves altruistically in one game but not in another,
we suggest that a more appropriate explanation is that there is not such a simple motivation
as altruism, but that there are several very speci¯c motives (such as altruism towards those
who are particularly poor, towards those who have been kind to me or towards those who
have been kind to others) and that these are not necessarily correlated. This suggests that
there will be higher stability of behavior within similar groups of games where the same
specialized motive is more likely to matter. The result of Andreoni and Miller (2002) that
almost all subjects make choices consistent with some convex preferences across several
dictator games points in this direction.32
As for subjects' rationality, several commentators on our paper encouraged us to check
whether Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) can explain our data.
32This is not to say that there are not other sources for instability of preferences, such that subjects make
di®erent choices even in the same game if the situation has changed in other respects. Having played all
games in the same setting in one go as in Andreoni and Miller (2002), however, is likely to have minimized
such e®ects in our experiment.
34
While we are sympathetic to this idea, we believe it is virtually impossible to conduct such
an analysis here. Almost all subjects have di®erent preferences (in terms of the ® and ¯
parameters). The QRE approach would require here that a player i chooses his (noisy)
best response against a probability distribution over the types of players i faces. Now, for
each type of player in this distribution, there is another probability distribution across the
various choices that this type of player might take. Conducting a QRE analysis, therefore,
seems a formidable task.
We note that we have applied the linear inequality model as suggested in F&S. One
might suspect that a generalized non-linear version would perform better in the analysis of
individual behavior. However, our main conclusions are based on the absence of a correla-
tion between the inequality aversion parameters which we estimated based on behavior in
the UG and MDG and the behavior in the other decision nodes. In a generalized version
a lower (higher) switching point in MDG (UG) would still result in a stronger measure of
inequality aversion. Put di®erently, according to the non-parametric measures we use, the
switching point and the measure of inequality aversion are perfectly correlated. Further-
more, inequality aversion has again the same implications for the decisions in the other
games, for example, stronger aversion to disadvantageous inequality implies lower contri-
bution levels in the PG. Now, the absence of a correlation between our estimates of the
inequality aversion parameters in the linear model and other decisions only means that the
switching points in the MDG and UG are not correlated with the other behavior. Since the
switching points are perfectly correlated with any non-linear measure of inequality aver-
sion, this means that such measures would not be signi¯cantly correlated with the behavior
in the other decision nodes either. Hence a non-linear model would fail to ¯nd support
exactly in the same instances as the linear model and nothing would be gained from such
a generalization within our framework|which is not to say that generalization would not
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improve the predictive power of F&S in other instances.33
7 Conclusions
In this paper we assess the predictive power of one of the central models of the other-
regarding preferences literature|inequality aversion|using a within-subjects design. We
run four di®erent experiments (an ultimatum game, a modi¯ed dictator game, a sequential
prisoner's dilemma and a public-good game) with the same sample of experimental subjects.
This allows us to make within-subjects comparisons across the decisions in the experiments.
We use the responder data from the ultimatum game and the data from the modi¯ed
dictator game to estimate the two parameters of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. We
then use this joint distribution of parameters to test several hypotheses about aggregate
and individual behavior in the other games.
The data show that results from a within-subject analysis can di®er markedly from
results obtained from an aggregate level analysis. We found that the Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) model predicts the ultimatum game proposals well at the aggregate level but not at
the individual level. The same holds for contributions to the public good and the ¯rst move
of the sequential prisoners' dilemma. Regarding second-mover behavior in the sequential
prisoners' dilemma, the model had predictive power at the individual level but not at the
aggregate level. In addition to our analysis based on the point estimates of the inequality-
aversion parameters, we checked more broadly for correlations across the decisions of the
33On a related matter, if subjects exhibit concerns for e±ciency or surplus maximization (see e.g. Charness
and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004), this may have biased our parameter estimates and also
in°uence other choices. This does not, however, a®ect our hypotheses with respect to the correlations with
the inequality aversion parameters at the individual level as long as e±ciency concerns are not correlated
with inequality aversion in some systematic way.
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experiment. It turns out that the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model predicts several of these
correlations correctly, particularly some of the decisions associated with reciprocity, but
other predicted correlations do not materialize. Therefore, we conclude that the model
does not perform well at the individual level and that the aggregate support of the theory,
if remarkable, should not be equated to individual-level validity.
We believe that the success of the inequality aversion model at the aggregate level could
be based on an ability to qualitatively capture di®erent important motives in di®erent
games but that the low predictive power of the model at an individual level is driven by the
low correlation of these motives within subjects. Thus it appears to be both the strength
and the weakness of the inequality aversion model that it can capture di®erent motives in
one functional form. On the one hand, this permits several apparently disparate results to
be rationalized in one simple model. On the other hand, an individual's behavior is not
well captured by the same model as di®erent motives drive behavior in di®erent situations
and this is not re°ected by the model. The inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) can hence serve as an elegant \as if" model in several situations one at a time, but
it does not appear to accurately and consistently re°ect the preferences of individuals.
There are examples in the literature where a theory predicts the aggregate level well
but fails at the individual level. Well known studies include market entry games where
the standard Nash equilibrium works surprisingly well at the aggregate level but where no
support is found at the individual level (e.g., Rapoport and Erev, 1998). Kahneman (1988)
writes that the market entry games work \like magic". Another example are posted-o®er
markets with a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. The distribution of prices is approximated
reasonably well by the prediction in such markets, even though individual pricing patterns
are clearly inconsistent with the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (Davis and Wilson, 1998).
Generally, the aggregate support of a model in experiments constitutes a remarkable
success of economic theory. How important failure at the individual level is may depend
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on the interest of the researcher. Some researchers may ¯nd the individual-level failure
of a theory intriguing and as a motive to search for further explanations of individual
behavioral patters, others may be perfectly content if a theory rationalizes the data at the
aggregate level. Following Friedman (1953), the failure of a model at the individual level
could be discarded as analytically irrelevant as long as aggregate results are broadly correct.
However, whereas Friedman (1953) and most standard economics emphatically deny the
descriptive accuracy of its behavioral assumptions, the other-regarding preferences models
are explicitly descriptive behavioral theories (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Whether
these models are \as if" approximations or indeed realistic descriptive models of individual
behavioral seems crucial here.
Finally, we would like to concede that the within-subjects test we have applied to the
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is possibly a very demanding one. Little is known about
how subjects play across games as individual-level comparisons have only rarely been con-
ducted.34 Themain reasons for focussing on the Fehr and Schmidt model here were practical
ones and the success it has achieved in the past. If we conclude that this model performs
poorly at the individual level, then this ¯nding is subject to the disclaimer that we do not
know how other theories perform across di®erent games. We believe that more research is
needed with respect to both tests of other models and tests across other games.
34Friedman and Sunder (2004) review empirical evidence on risk preferences. They argue that researchers
have only rarely tried to compare individual decisions across di®erent contexts. Moreover, even when such
attempts have been made, risk preferences inferred from one experiment were often not able to account for
other decisions. See, however, Andersen et al. (2005) who report stable risk preferences when subjects had
to repeat the same risk-aversion task at two points in time.
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Here, we formally derive the hypotheses of the results section. Some proofs can also be
found in F&S.
Hypothesis 1 (i) Subjects with ¯i > 0:5 should o®er si = 10 in the Ultimatum Game. (ii)
Subjects with ¯i < 0:5 may, depending on their beliefs, o®er either si = 10 or si < 10 in
the Ultimatum Game.
Proof. An o®er of s = 10 will surely be accepted by all responders and thus gives the
proposer a utility of Ui(10; 10) = 10: O®ering s < 10 either gives zero utility to the proposer
if the o®er is rejected or Ui(20¡s; s) = 20¡s¡¯i(20¡2s) if it is accepted. When ¯i > 0:5;
we have 20¡s¡¯i(20¡ 2s) < 10; hence, these subjects will choose s = 10:When ¯i < 0:5;
by contrast, 20 ¡ s¡ ¯i(20¡ 2s) > 10 and the proposer gains from o®ering s < 10 if the
o®er is accepted. Whether or not a subject with ¯i < 0:5 will actually o®er s < 10 depends
on the beliefs whether such an o®er will be accepted.
In the next hypothesis, let yi denote the contribution of subject i in the PG.
Hypothesis 2 (i) Subjects with ¯i < 0:3 should choose yi = 0 in the PG. (ii) Subjects with
¯i > 0:3 may, depending on their beliefs, contribute any yi 2 [0; 10] in the PG.
Proof. Suppose player i believes that player j will contribute y 2 [0; 10] so that the
payo® for player i is 10 ¡ yi + 0:7(yi + y) = 10 + 0:7y ¡ 0:3yi and the payo® of player j
is 10 + 0:7yi ¡ 0:3y: If player i also contributes y; he gets a utility of 10 + 0:4y: If player i
contributes yi < y, this yields a utility of 10 +0:3(y¡ yi)+ 0:4y¡¯i(y¡ yi) which is larger
than 10 + 0:4y if, and only, if ¯i < 0:3. If player i contributes yi > y, this yields a utility
of 10¡ 0:3(yi ¡ y) + 0:4y ¡ ®i(yi ¡ y) < 10 + 0:4y if ® ¸ 0, which holds for every subject.
Hence, player i will never contribute more than y; will, depending on his beliefs, contribute
y 2 [0; 10] if ¯i > 0:3, and will contribute yi = 0 if ¯i < 0:3: Note, ¯nally, as players with
¯i < 0:3 should choose yi = 0 for any degenerate belief, they should also choose yi = 0 for
any non-degenerate belief on yj:
Hypothesis 3 (i) Given ¯rst-mover cooperation, second movers in the SPD should defect
if, and only if, ¯ < 0:3: (ii) Given ¯rst-mover defection, second movers in the SPD should
defect.
Proof. (i) If the ¯rst mover cooperates, player i prefers to defect if, and only, if
Ui(14; 14) < Ui(17; 7); that is, if, and only if, 14 < 17 ¡ ¯i(17 ¡ 7) , ¯i < 0:3: (ii) If
the ¯rst mover defects, player i is better o® defecting regardless of the inequality parame-
ters since Ui(10; 10) = 10 > Ui(7; 17) = 7 ¡ 10®i and ®i ¸ 0:
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Hypothesis 4 If subjects know the true distribution of the ¯ parameter, ¯rst-movers in
the SPD should cooperate if, and only if, ®i < 0:52.
Proof. If the ¯rst mover defects, the second mover will also defect (regardless of ®j and
¯j) and both players get Ui(10; 10) = 10: Let the ¯rst mover's belief for the second mover to
cooperate be p: Then the expected payo® from cooperating is pUi(14; 14)+(1¡p)Ui(7; 17);
and cooperating yields an expected payo® higher than defecting if, and only if,
®i < e® = 7p ¡ 310(1 ¡ p):
From the analysis of the second movers above, we know that second movers reciprocate
cooperation if, and only if, ¯i > 0:3: In the data, we have 41 subjects with ¯i > 0:3: Hence,
p = 41=61 = 0:672: Using this value of p; cooperating as a ¯rst mover pays if, and only if,
®i < 0:52:
Characterization of the MDG (not intended for publi-
cation)
The purpose of the MDG is to obtain a (near) point estimate of the ¯ parameter for rational
F&S-type of players with ¯i 2 [0; 1). In this appendix, we show that the MDG design we
use is the simplest design to obtain such an estimate in an environment uncontaminated
by intentions and beliefs.
Such an estimate of the ¯ parameter can be found if, and only if, we can elicit the point
where player i is indi®erent between two outcomes (xi; xj) and (x0i; x0j) such that
xi ¡¯i(xi ¡ xj) = x0i ¡ ¯i(x0i ¡ x0j): (4)
For this equality to have a unique solution in ¯i; we need to impose three conditions here.
First, we need xi ¸ xj and x0i ¸ x0j with at least one inequality being strict|otherwise the
¯ parameter would not apply at all. Second, we do not get any information from the trivial
solution where (xi; xj) = (x0i; x0j). Third, we need sign(xi¡ x0i) = sign(xi ¡ xj ¡ (x0i ¡ x0j))
because otherwise one outcome is strictly preferred to the other for any ¯i:Without loss of
generality, we can set xi = xj and obtain




x0i ¡ x0j (6)
We want to get a (near) point estimate through binary choices. So we need to let
subjects make choices between various outcomes (corresponding to one side of (5)) and a
constant outcome (corresponding to the other side of (5)). The choices must be designed
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such that any player with ¯i 2 [0; 1) will prefer xi over x0i ¡ ¯i(x0i ¡ x0j) for at least one
but not for all binary choices of the game. In that case, we know that player i has some
¯i 2 [¯; ¯] with 0 · ¯ · ¯i · ¯ < 1.
For our MDG, we decided to keep the right-hand side of (5) constant (with x0i = 20
and x0j = 0) and vary the left-hand side (with xi 2 f0; 1; 2:::20g). Now, all players with
¯i 2 [0; 1) prefer (20,0) over (0,0) and they also (weakly) prefer (20,20) over (20,0). It
follows that our MDG is suitable to elicit the ¯i parameter. In particular, it also allows
us to detect whether there are any subjects with ¯i ¸ 1; namely if they choose (0,0) over
(20,0).
Consider the alternative to keep the left-hand side constant and vary the right-hand side.
We obviously need only consider x0i ¸ xi and x0j · xi: Let us ¯rst keep x0i > xi ¯xed. By
varying x0j between 0 and xi; we can detect any ¯ between (x0i ¡ xi)=x0i and 1. If, however,
a subject prefers (x0i; 0) over (xi; xi) we can only conclude that ¯i · (x0i ¡ xi)=x0i; where
(x0i ¡ xi) =x0i > 0 by assumption. (Even if we allow the rather unrealistic case of x0j < 0;
this problem does not disappear since x0j will obviously have to be ¯nite. Furthermore, if
we choose xi > xj; the denominator of ¯i will be x0j ¡ (xi ¡ xj), and hence the minimal
¯i that could be detected would increase.) In order to detect whether there are subjects
with ¯i = 0; we need to add another choice where x0i = xi and x0j < xi; because all subjects
with ¯i > 0 will prefer (xi; xi) over (xi; x0j): Hence in order to investigate the whole interval
[0; 1]; we need to vary both x0i and x0j across choices, which is arguably more complicated
for subjects than our design.
Alternatively, let us keep x0j < xi ¯xed. By varying x0i between xi and xi + k; we can
identify all ¯i between 0 and k=(k + xi ¡ x0j): If a subject prefers (xi; xi) over (xi + k; x0j);
we can only conclude that ¯i ¸ k=(k + xi ¡ x0j); where k=(k + xi ¡ x0j) < 1: (If we choose
xi > xj; the denominator of ¯i will be k + (xi ¡ x0j) ¡ (xi ¡ xj). While this increases the
maximal ¯ that could be identi¯ed, it will still be smaller than 1 since (xi¡x0j) > (xi¡xj);
because in order to detect any ¯i smaller than 1, the ¯xed x0j has to be smaller than xj:)
Since k obviously has to be kept ¯nite, in order to detect whether there are subjects with
¯i ¸ 1; we have to add another choice where x0i > xi and x0j = xi because all subjects
with ¯i < 1 will prefer (x0i; xi) over (xi; xi): Hence again we would have to vary both x0i
and x0j across choices in order to study the whole range of permissible ¯: Consequently, our
design (except setting xi = xj; which is no restriction) is structurally the simplest design




ultimatum game UG $20 pie, proposer gets $(20-s) and responder s if
the responder accepts, both get zero otherwise
modi¯ed dictator game MDG dictator chooses between $20-$0 and equitable
outcomes ranging from $0-$0 to $20-$20
sequential prisoners' dilemma SPD both defect: $10-$10; both cooperate: $14-$14;
one defects, one cooperates: $17-$7
public good game PG two players, $10 endowment per player, marginal
per capita return on contributions is 0.7
Table 1. The experimental design. Each subject played all four games once. In the UG
and the SPD, subjects made decisions at all nodes. All choices were made without
feedback on decisions of earlier games. Therefore, the strategy-elicitation method was
used where necessary.
® F&S data ¯ F&S data
0 · ® < 0:4 30% 31% 0 · ¯ < 0:235 30% 29%
0:4 · ® < 0:92 30% 33% 0:235 · ¯ < 0:5 30% 15%
0:92 · ® < 4:5 30% 23% 0:5 · ¯ · 1 40% 56%
4:5 · ® <1 10% 13%
Table 2. Distribution of ® and ¯ as assumed in F&S and as observed in our data.
® ¯ UG o®er PG SPD 1st SPD 2nd
® | -0.03 0.40¤¤ 0.07 -0.03 0.19
¯ | 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.34¤¤
UG o®er | 0.19 0.13 0.49¤¤
PG | 0.24 0.41¤¤
SPD 1st | 0.43¤¤
SPD 2nd |
Table 3. Correlations between decisions (Spearman ½ for two ordinally scaled variables;
rank biserial correlation for one ordinally scaled variable and one dichotomous nominally
scaled variable; phi coe±cient for two dichotomous nominally scaled variables),
¤¤ indicates signi¯cance at the 1% level.
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Figure 1: The joint α-β distribution. Each dot in the figure represents an 
individual’s α and β parameter. Observations to the left of the α=β line have 
α<β. Observations with the highest level of α cannot be pinned down more 







β < 0.5s < 10







choices in the UG β parameter choices in the UG
(aggregate data) (aggregate data) (conditional on β)
Figure 2: Aggregate versus individual-level analysis of UG offers. The left and 
the middle column show the proportions of s=10 (equal split) offers in the UG 
and the share of β>0.5 subjects, respectively, at the aggregate level. These 
proportions are roughly equal which is consistent with F&S at the aggregate 
level. The right column shows UG offers conditional on the individual β
parameters. Subjects with β>0.5 should offer s=10 but only slightly more than 
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PG contributions β parameter PG contributions
(aggregate data) (aggregate data) (conditional on β)
Figure 3: Aggregate versus individual-level analysis of PG contributions 
(denoted by y). The left column shows the proportion of zero contributions and 
the middle column the share of β<0.3 subjects. The proportions are rather 
equal which is consistent with the F&S theory at the aggregate level. The right 
column shows PG contributions conditional on the individual β parameters. 
Subjects with β<0.3 should not contribute but almost two thirds of them do. 














2nd move in the SPD β parameter 2nd move in the SPD 
(aggregate data) (aggregate data) (conditional on β)
Figure 4: Aggregate versus individual-level analysis of the second move in the 
SPD. The left and the middle column show the proportions of cooperate 
choices in the SPD and the share of β>0.3 subjects, respectively. The F&S 
theory predicts that subjects should cooperate if and only if β>0.3. As these 
proportions differ at the aggregate level, the theory is rejected. Looking at 
cooperation decisions conditional on β (right column), a  larger share of the 















1st move in the SPD α parameter 1st move in the SPD 
(aggregate data) (aggregate data) (conditional on α)
Figure 5: Aggregate versus individual-level analysis of the first move in the 
SPD. The left and the middle column show the proportions of cooperate 
choices in the SPD and the share of α < 0.52 subjects, respectively. The F&S 
theory predicts that subjects should cooperate if and only if α < 0.52, provided 
subjects know the distribution of the β parameter. The differences between 
these proportions do not differ significantly at the aggregate level which 
supports the theory. Looking at cooperation decisions conditional on α (right 
column), the proportions of cooperators and defectors are virtually identical 
regardless of the α parameter, rejecting the F&S theory at the individual level.
